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Introduction
　　This　study　investigates　the　relationship　between　the　media　and　politics
over　the　Iraq　War　by　extensively　analyzing　the　contents　of　both　US　and
Japanese　two　leading　newspaper：the　New　York　Times　and　the　Asahi．
Specifically，　this　work　fbcuses　on　the　mn－up　period　of　the　war．　The－six－
months　period　befbre　the　war　in　Iraq　was　crucially　important　not　only　fbr
determining　the　course　of　the　conflict，　but　also　providing　the　basic　ground　of
several　intemational　schisms，　such　as　the　discrepancy　between　the　US－UK
alliance　and　some　continental　European　countries．
　　The　main　goal　of　this　study　is　to　discover　both　the　di　ffe　rences　and
similarities　of　the　political　communication　systems　between　the　US　and
Japan．　The　two　countries　are　virtually　saturated　by　the　media，　such　as
around－the－clock　television　coverage　and　a　wide　variety　of　newspapers，
many　of　which　have　a　circulation　with　millions．　Yet，　the　content　analysis　of
this　stUdy　finds　that　the　two　allies　have　quite　distinctive　treatments　of　the
war　during　the　nm－up　period，　especially　their　rationalization　of　the　cause　of
the　Iraq　War，　and　role　and　the　power　of　the　United　Nations　in　relation　te　the
war．
1．The　lmq　War　and　the　Media
　　The　war　in　Iraq（the　Iraq　War，　the　Second　Persian　Gulf　War）and　its
aftermath　is，　without　a　doubt，　one　of　the　biggest　news　events　in　this　decade．
The　war　was　f（）ught　between　a”Coalition　of　the　Willing，”consisting
primarily　of　American　and　British　fbrces，　but　also　including　Polish，
Australian，　and　Iraqi　fbrces．　Approximately　250，000　United　States　troops，
with　support　from　45，000　British，　and　smaller　fbrces丘om　other　nations，
entered　Iraq　primarily　through　a　staging　area　in　Kuwait（Milbank，2003）．
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The　war　lasted　only　fbr　42　days丘om　March　20　to　May　l，2003．
　　President　George　W．　Bush’s　announcement　of　the　end　of　the”official
combat”（May　l，2003），　however，　was　not　the　end　ofthe　rami行cations　of　the
warfare．　It　was　only　the　beginning：numbers　of　Iraqi　insurgent　attacks　have
been　dominating　the　news　since　then　until，　at　least，　the　fall　of　2005，when
this　essay　was　written．　The　official　number　of　U．S．　troops　who　have　died　in
the　Iraq　war　hit　2，000　by　October　25，2005（White　and　Tyson　2005）．
According　to　the　Iraq　Body　Count，　the　number　of　civilian　death　toll　in　Iraq　is
about　between　26000　and　30000　by　the　end　of　October　2005．　Also，
kidnapping　and　subsequent　murders　of　civilians　from　the　US　and　other
allies，　including　Japan，　have　terrified　audiences　of　the　media　all　over　the
world．　The　revelation　of　several　military　scandals，　most　notably　the　Abu
Graib　incidents，　provided　us　an　occasion　to　second　guess　the　meaning　ofthis
war．
　　The　Iraq　War　was　probably　the　most　media－centered　conflict　war　in
history．　More　than　l　500　journalists　fピom　around　the　world，　including
Japanese，　entered　the　battle　zone．　They　attempted　to　report　what　was
happening　on　the　battlefront，　analyze　next　developments，　and　explore　the
new　world　order　after　the　demise　of　the　Saddam　Hussein’s　regime．　Some
6000f　them　are　actually　embedded　with　the　coalition　fbrces　during　the
combat．　Also，”unilateral”independent　journalists　joined　the　camps　of
journalists（Kurtz，2003）．　Not　only　newspapers　and　televisions，24－hour
cable　and　satellite　networks，　but　also　numerous　numbers　of　intemet　blogs
reported　latest　developments　and　delivered　their　analyses．
　　We　witnessed　significant　and　interesting　aspects　in　the　relationship
between　the　media　and　the　politics　during　the　war　in　Iraq．　Especially，　the　US
media’s　role　in　the　war　has　been　a　matter　of　concem　fbr　scholars　and　the
media　organizations　themselves。　Since　the　war　ended，　a　great　amount　of
literature　has　been　produced　to　argue　the　role　in　the　war－一一much　has　been
written　about　the　media　by　media　critics，　and　many　critical　self－
examinations　by　joumalists　themselves．‘Mea　culpas専have　been　abundant，
particularly　after　David　Kay，　former　U．S．　chief　weapons　inspector，
announced　in　early　2004　that”we　were　almost　all　wrong”about　Iraqi
weapons　ofmass　destructions（Achenbach　2004）．
　　A　number　of　these　criticisms　shany）ly　point　out　the　weakness　of　the　media
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in　the　battleground．　Those　works　suggest　that　the　US　media　has　played　a
cheerleading　role　to　the　Bush　Administration，　and　that　the　media　promoted
the　war　without　serving　as　a　watchdog　of　the　government．　Some　critics　call
the　US　media，s　role　in　the　war”weapons　of　mass　deception．”because　the
media　had　put　an　emphasis　on　supporting　the　war　effort　of　the　Bush
administration　over　reportorial　o切ectivity（Schechter　2003）．　NOt　only　in　the
US，　but　also　in　Europe　and　Asia，　including　Japan，　literature　cast　doubt　on　the
且mctions　of　the　media　during　the　Iraq　War（e．g．　Ishizawa　2005）．
　　One　obvious　example　is　the　controversial　role　of　a　New　York　Times
reporter　Judith　Miller．　Miller’s　serial　reporting　on　weapons　of　mass
destruction　in　Iraq　gamered　the　public　support　fbr　the　initiation　of　the　Iraq
War．　The　reports，　however，　were　later　shown　to　be　false．　Miller’s　coverage
indeed　had　depth，　but　the　depth　was　fbrmed　by　a　series　of　propaganda
statements　of　the　Bush　government（Van　Na枕a，　Liptak　and　LeVy，2005）．
　　As　shown　by　the　Miller’s　case，　o切ectivity　is　one　of　the　most　difficult
issues　in　war　reporting．　Since　the　attacks　of　911，　there　has　been　an　active
discussion　over　manipulation　of　the　media　by　the　Bush　Administration
（Cole，2005）．　Karl　Rove　of　the　Administration　and　his　media　team　have
worked　a　great　deal　in　public　relations．　Especially　during　the　run－up　period
of　the　Iraq　War，　many　critics　argue　that　the　Administration　was　very　skillfUl
in　emphasizing　the　need　and　urgency　to　attack　Iraq．　The　Administration
superbly　presented　the　dichotomous　arguments　between”us　and　them”or
”good　and　evil．”These　presentations　of　the　Administration　include　the
contrast　between”despotic　and　Al　Qaeda－related「’Hussein　regime　and
”democratic　and丘ee”US，　or”procrastinated　and　with　loopholes”UN
inspections　and　USls”serious　attempts　to　end　the　terror　network．”Since　the
Bush　Administration　was　more　skilled　in　providing　these　images　than　their
counterparts，　such　as　the　Hussein　Administration　or　the　UN　inspections
teams，　the　US　media　constantly　resorted　to　the　Bush　Administration　as　the
primary　source　of　the　news．　Thus，　not　only　the　people　in　the　US，　but　also
relatively　large　portions　of　the　intemational　community，　came　to　believe
such　self：serving　presentations．
　　On　initiating　attacks　in　Baghdad，　the　Administration　also　introduced
another　method　to　control　the　content　of　the　media　in　the　battlefield．　The
Administration　allowed　journalists　to　embed　in　specific　military　units　in　the
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War．　Although　joumalists　were　experiencing　unprecedented　access　to　the
battlefield　and　their　stories　would　be　very　real，　there　were　concems　fbr　the
cost　of　embedded　joumalism．　First，　there　were　numbers　of　restrictions　in
reporting　because　embedded　joumalists　had　to　sign　a　contract　restricting
when　and　what　they　could　report．　The　details　of　military　actions　could　only
be　described　in　general　terms　and　j　ournalists　were　not　allowed　at　all　to　report
possible　future　missions　or　about　classified　information　they　might　find．
Also，　the　commander　of　an　embedded　journalist’s　unit　could　declare　a
，blackoutl　in　filing　stories　via　satellite　fbr　security　reasons．　More　importantly，
it　was　assumed　that　with　or　without　being　conscious，　embedded　joumalists
are　more　likely　to　be　sympathetic　toward　the　coalition　fbrces，　even　if　a
journalist　doesn’t　necessarily　want　to　be．　This　is　because　embedded
joumalist’s　lives　were　at　the　mercy　of　the　fate　of　his／her　trooP，　and　as　such
of　the　”Stockholm　syndrome”　was　created．　The　syndrome　describes　how　an
onlooker　becomes　part　of　that　group．　The”embeds”are　protected　by　the　US
f（）rces　and　their　lives　are　in　the　hands　of　the　f（）rces（Brandenburg　2005）．
Thus，　o切ectivity　may　be　lost　under　such　extraordinary　conditions．
　　Since　the　end　of　the　war，　scholars　have　attempted　to　define　the　impact　of
embedding　joumalism．　These　studies　are　in　the　preliminary　stages，　and　the
results　are　mixed．　Although　one　study　finds　that　the　embedding　experiment
actually　distorted　the　media　content（Pfau，　et　aL　2004），　another　concludes
that　the　impact　is　relatively　small（Aday，　Livingston　and　Hebert，2005）．　Now
it　is　assumed　that　scholarly　debate　over　the　impact　of　embedding　will　not
end　fbr　some　time，
　　The　Bush　Administration　also　attempted　to　affect　the　language　being
heard　in　the　media．　There　were　always　plenty　of　euphemisms　about　the　Iraq
War．　One　of　the　most　widespread　terms　emerging　by　the　Administration
during　the　War　is”shock　and　awe，”abombing　campaign　by　the　coalition
fbrces　designed　to　te㎡fy　an　enemy　into　submission．　Also，　other　jargons　of
the　Pentagon　came　to　be丘equently　used　in　the　media　during　the　war．　One
example　is”to　decapitate．”The　US　media　came　to　use　phrases　such　as”the
coalition　fbrces　tried　to’decapitate電the　Iraqi　regime，”to　describe　the　concept
冒曾奄煤@tried　to　kill　Saddam　Hussein．”In　addition，　the　more　familiar　term
，collateral　damage，　was丘equently　used　to　indicate　Iraqi　civilian　casualties．
There　are　acute　criticisms　about　the　new　phrases　that　the　govemment　has
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crafted　to　describe　its　reaction　to　the　war．　Critics　argue　that　some　reporters
were　quick　to　adopt　the　Administration，s　new　terminology　which　simplify
the　complications，　and　sanitize　the　battle．　These　terms　present　a　reality
which　lacks　an　understanding　toward　the　impact　and　scope　of　the　military
actions．　Consequently，　the　media　may　eventually　mislead　the　public
（Bowers，2003）．
　　This　battle　euphemism　is　one　of　the　legacies　of　the　First　Gulf　War　of
1991．During　the負rst　Gulf　War，　the　military　supplied　attractive　battlefield
pictures　that　j　oumalists　fbund　dif行cult　to　refUse．　The　military　also　could　bar
press　access　to　potentially　embarrassing　scenes　and　persuade　the　public　that
such　restraint　was　necessary　fbr　national　security．　Critics　suggest　that　the
war　became　a　picture－book　war　that　glorified　skills　of　military　leaders　and
largely　concealed　the　bloody　realities　of　the　combat．　Along　with　videos，　new
terms　were　created　by　the　senior　Bush　Administrations　during　the　First　Gulf
War．　These　terms　include”pinpoint　attack”or”smart　bombs．”These
technological　terms　disguised　plenty　of　botched　results　lacking　in　accuracy．
However，　because　of　the　technological　superiority　of　the　US，　audiences
came　to　believe　in　the　excellence　of　the　attacks　and　in　a　minimum　amount　of
civilian　damage　even　if　not　many　people　exactly　knew　what”sma質”means
（Hachten　and　Hachten　1996）．
皿．Research　Design．
1）Methods
　　This　study　employs　both　quantitative　and　qualitative　content　analysis　of
newspaper　articles．　Content　analysis　is　a　research　methodology　that　utilizes　a
set　of　procedures　to　make　valid　inferences　from　text（Weber　1985）．　Content
analysis　is　a　frequently　used　method　in　political　communication　research　to
determine　generalizations　of　the　content　of　recorded　instances　of
communication，　such　as　newspaper　articles，　speech　texts，　and　academic
textbooks．　The　chief　strength　of　content　analyses（both　quantitative　and
qualitative）is　that　they　enable　us　to　study　occurring　messages　in　media．
Using　quantification，　quantitative　content　analysis　can　be　a　systematic
method　f（）r　understanding　the　particular　traits　of　media　messages　or　news
contents．　By　contrast，　qualitative　content　analysis　attempts　to　investigate　the
underlying　content　in　the　text　or　to　define　the”purpose”of　the　text　the
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author　intentionally（or　sometimes　unintentionally）wants　to　deliver　to　the
readers（Hofstetter　1981）．
　　Using　content　analysis　methods，　this　work　compares　US　and　Japanese
media　coverage　during　the　run－up　period　of　the　Iraq　War．　Articles　of　the
〈lew　y∂rk　Times　and　the！lsahi　Sh珈わ槻in　Japan，　both　of　which　are　leading
newspapers　of　the　respective　countries，　are　investigated．　Both　papers　are
considered　as　politically　liberal．　Articles　are　collected丘om　two　databases，
the　Asahi　Shimbun　database（Kikuzo），　and　the　LEXIS－／＞EXI∫（the　New　York
Times）。　Regarding　the　Asahi，　the　newspaper　has　moming　and　evening　daily
papers　except　on　Sundays　and　holidays，　and　both　versions　are　examined．
Although　the　Asahi　has　five　different　regional　editions，　this　study　uses　the
Tokyo　edition，　which　is　circulated　in　the　metropolitan　Tokyo　area．
　　One　of　the　fbcal　points　of　this　content　analysis　is　the　investigation　into
whether　same　issues　and　events　are　portrayed　in　similar　or　different　ways
between　US（as　represented　by　the　New　York　Times）and　Japanese（as
represented　by　the　Asahi）media．　In　other　words，　the　question　is　whether　the
media　contents　over　Iraq　were　socially　constnucted　differently　by　the　media
of　two　different　countries．　In　order　to　conduct　this　analysis，　special　fbcus　in
this　part　of　content　analysis　will　be　on　the”media　frames，”which　are　the
narrative　stnlctures　the　news　media　provide（Johnson－Cartee，2005）．　The
media　present”frames”by　providing　readers　with　a　fairly　common　view　of
the　maj　or　actors，　events　and　themes．　Understanding　how　the　adoption　of　a
particular　media丘ame　will　be　accounts　fbr　the　constmction　of　news　stories
and　interactions　among　various　antagonists　in　reporting　the　war　in　Iraq．
　　Since　the　media　deliver　those　reports　in　order　to　fit　those　frames　and　see
the　events　with　certain　viewpoints，　those　reports　tend　to　have　some
storyline（s）。　These　storylines　are　sometimes　hidden　and　difficult　to　observe
in　ordinary　news　stories．　They　are，　however，　likely　to　become　very　clear　in
big　news　events．　This　is　because　the　news　media　doesn’t　want　its
audience／readers　to　be　inundated　with　numerous，　but　unconnected　new
findings．　Big　news　events　continuously　generate　an　abundant　number　of
articles　or　television　newsfeeds，　and　the　media　unintentionally　or
intentionally　has　to　present　the　news　with　familiar　storylines．　Also，　fbr　the
purpose　of　satisfying　its　audience／readers，　the　media　often　featUres　human
interest　stories　in　big　news　events．　These　stories，　however，　are　likely　to　be
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one　of　the　common　episodes　we　have　often　heard．　Since　the　war　in　Iraq　is，
without　a　doubt，　a　fairly　big　news　events，　there　is　ample　data　fbr　media
丘ames　and　media　storylines　in　reporting．
　　Another　important　part　of　the　content　analysis　is　the　identification　of　the
sources　of　news，　which　presents　clues　to　understanding　the　flow　of
information．　In　war　reporting，　flows　of　information　are　crucial　to　reveal　the
propaganda　of　the　govemment．　The　identification　of　the　sources　determines
who　is　in　charge　of　disseminating　infbrmation，　and　also　who　wants　to
propagate　their　own　purpose　fbr　the　war．　Also，　it　may　highlight　the　power
relationship　among　political　actors　and　reveals　the　agenda－setters　of　policies．
Acritical　question　at　the　heart　of　news　coverage　is，　indeed，　whose
perspectives　will　be　heard．
2）The　Time　Frame　and　Maj　or　Events　during　the　Run－up　period　of　the　Iraq
War．
　　The　period　to　analyze　is　from　the　US　Congressional　approval　on　Iraqi
a賃ack（October　l，2002）to　one　day　befbre　the　beginning　of　the　Iraq　War
（March　l　9，2003）．　During　that　period，　the　NYT　had　more　then　4000　articles
that　contain　a　word”Iraq，”and　the　Asahi　had　more　then　3000　articles　that
carry　the　word”lraku”（Iraq　in　Japanese）．　Those　articles　included　unrelated
stories　such　as　one　in　a　sports　or　entertainment　pages．　This　study　analyzes
articles　that　featUre　the　lraq　issues．　In　total　l　242　NYT　and　990　Asahi　articles
which　mainly　featUred　lraq　have　been　selected　to　be　analyzed．
　　During　the　run－up　period　of　the　War，　the　United　States　related　to
intemational　affairs　in　a　crisis　mode．　The　US　continued　to行ght　the”war
against　terror，”which　is　a　consequence　of　the　attacks　of　September　l　l，2001．
Although　the　alleged　links　between　the　Al　Qaeda　and　Saddam　Hussein’s
regime　were　not　proven，　the　War　in　Iraq　was　prepared　based　on　the
perceptions　that　Iraq　was　on　the　side　of　the　terrorists．
　　There　are　several　important　developments　during　the　run－up　period．　First，
the　US　Congress　authorized　an　attack　on　Iraq　on　October．11，2002．　Second，
the　UN　Security　Council　unanimously　approved　UN　Resolution　1441，which
imposed　tougher　new　arms　inspections　on　Iraq　on　Nov．8．　After　2003
began，　the　war　became　more　and　more　inescapable．　On　January　28，
President　Bush　announced　in　his　State　of　the　Union　Address　that　he　was
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ready　to　attack　Iraq　even　without　a　UN　mandate．　Although　only　Spain　and
Bulgaria　supported　the　idea，　the　US．　and　Britain　seriously　lobbied　to　gamer
support　fbr　a　strike　on　Iraq　among　UN　Security　Council　members．　Finally，　at
5：30a．m．　Baghdad　time　on　March　20（9：30　p．m．　US　Eastem　Standard　Time，
March　l　9），　the　US．　launched　Operation　Iraqi　Freedom．　The　war　in　Iraq
began．
　　This　work　does　not　include　the　prior　events　to　this　period．　Critics　suggest，
however，　the　Bush　administration　had　steadily　prepared　fbr　the　war．　Bush
stated　in　his　State　of　the　Union　Address　that　Iraq　was　part　of　an”axis　of
evi1”（January．29，2002）．　Also，　Bush　publicly　introduced　the　new　defense
doctrine　of　preemption　in　a　speech　at　West　Point（June　2，2002），　Based　on
this　preemption　doctrine，　Bush　asked　the　UN　to　swiftly　enfbrce　its　own
resolutions　against　Iraq　on　September．12，2002．　Bush　also　stressed　that　if
the　UN　did　not　fbllow　his　suggestion，　the　U．S．　must　act　on　its　own．
皿．Major　Results　of　the　Content　Analysis
　　There　are　significant　differences　in　media　reporting　in　the　United　States
and　Japan　in　the　five　months　prior　to　the　war　in　Iraq．　During　this　period，　the
tWo　countries’　media　show　sharp　distinctions　in　many　ways，　especially　in　the
degrees　of　how　much　the　media　is　supportive　of　US　governmental　decisions
and　how　much　the　power　the　United　Nations　has．　Also，　the　two　newspapers
have　different　accounts　of　the　imminence　of　the　US　invasion　of　lraq．　One　of
maj　or　storylines　of　the　New　York　Times　is　that　the　second　Gulf　War　was
imminent　because　Saddam　Hussein　was　not　cooperative　with　United
Nations’nuclear　inspections．　By　contrast，　an　Asahi’s　dominant　storyline　is
that　the　United　States　must　not　rush　to　start　any　military　actions，　although
Saddam　Hussein　was　not　cooperative　and　a　terrible　despot．　Also，　striking
difference　is　fbund　between　the　two　media　in　their　description　of　certain
incidents　in　the　War，　such　as　civilian　casualties．　As　a　result，　the　two
countries’　leading　media　have　portrayed　different”realities”of　the　War　in
Iraq，　as　if　two　di脆rent　wars　were　developing　at　the　same　time．　In　the
fbllowing，　five　maj　or　storylines　ofthe　two　papers　are　explained　in　detail．
1）US　policies　of　Iraq
The　tWo　media　organizations　emphasized　different　storylines，　The　NYT’s
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most　featured　articles　are”US　policies　over　Iraq，”but”international
relations”is　the　Asahi’s　most　common　maj　or　storyline　during　this　period．
While　65％of　the　articles　of　the　NYT　contains　some　reference　of　the
American　policies　over　Iraq，　only　32％ofthe　Asahi　articles　refers　to　the　US
actions．　Instead，49％of　the　Asahi　articles　refers　to　UN　diplomacy　or　the
relationship　betWeen　the　UN　and　other　countries，　such　as　France，　Germany
and　Japan．
　　During　this　period，　the　New　York　Times　uses　large　portions　of　the　Iraqi
stories　to　discuss　the　next　possible　actions　by　the　Bush　Administrations．
Compared　with　the　Asahi，　it　is　very　noticeable　that　the　articles　of　the　NYT
attempted　to　deliver　to　their　readers　a　very　concrete　analysis　of　the
Administration’s　actions．　This　may，　however，　raise　the　question　of
obj　ectivity　during　the　war．　As　mentioned　befbre，　obj　ectivity　is　one　of　the
most　difficult　tasks　in　war　reporting．　To　a　staff　writer　at　the　NYT，　these
stories　are　written　based　on”correct”infbrmation　from　their　news　source．
But　the　problem　is　that　the　more　they　fbllow”accurately”their　particular
news　sources　that　coincide　with　the　govemment’s　position，　the　closer　their
stories　become　to　government　propaganda．　As　a　consequence，　the　writer　has
played　the　role　of　cheerleader　to　the　Administration，　although　what　the
writer　wants　to　attempt　is　to　be　as　obj　ective　as　possible．　In　this　way，　many
stories　of　the　New　York　Times　were　framed丘om　the　perspective　of　the
Bush　Administrations．　Accordingly，　the　stories　of　the　NYT　present　a
relatively　favorable　position　to　the　pre－emptive　attack　on　Iraq．
　　In　contrast　to　the　New　York　Times，　the　Asahi　has　been　consistently
critical　toward　the　Bush　Administration’s　policy　over　Iraq．　Yoichi
Funabashi，　one　of　the　most　famous　editors　in　the　newspaper　reiterates　during
this　period　his　disagreement　with　the　US　policy　over　Iraq．　Writing　in　an
article　named”An　Open　Letter　to　the　Bush　Administration”（October　8，
2002），he　presents　his　argument　against　the　Administration．　Funabashi　says，
”［1】fthe　United　States　overreacts　militarily，　there　is　also　the　fear　that　it　could
Iead　to　more　war．”Thus，　he　believes　that　the　US　should　not　msh　and　act　on
the　Iraq　crisis　in　light　of　long－term　national　interests．
Also，　it　is　clearly　noticeable　that　the　Asahi　reports　much　less　information
about　the　American　side．　While　the　Asahi　frequently　quotes　comments　of
the　officials　of　the　Bush　Administration，　the　paper　does　not　share　large
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portions　of　the　US　govemment’s　views　over　Iraq　issues．　Regarding　Bush
Administration’s　contemplation　of　the　war，　the　Asahi　does　not　report　the
possible　plans　of　attack　or　degrees　ofpreparations．
　　The　Asahi’s　anti－Bush’°media丘ame”becomes　obvious　in　November　2002
when　German　Chancellor　Gerhard　Schroeder　announced　his　decision　not　to
join　the　coalition　fbrces　as　a　way　to　oPPose　the　Bush　Administrationls
policies　over　Iraq．　Both　the　NYT　and　the　Asahi　featured　the　Schroeder’s
decision　in　several　articles．　The　NYT’s　articles　fbcus　on　losing　the　help　of
the　former　ally　in　the　First　Gulf　War．　Asahi，s　tone，　nonetheless，　is　somewhat
laudatory．　The　Asahi　indicates　that　the　decision　by　the　Schroeder
Administration　appears　to　be　rational　while　it　seems　to　find　that　the　US’s
polices　over　Iraq　have　become　too　bellicose．
　　It　is　important　to　suggest　that　the　Asahi’s丘ame　of　news　does　not　ref【ect
the　Koizumi　Administration’s　official　positions　at　alL　The　Koizumi
Administration　has　supported　the　US　policies　over　Iraq．　During　the　nm－up
period，　Prime　Minister　Koizumi　publicly　expressed　support　fbr　the　US電s
effort　to　fight　against　terrorism　and　criticized　Hussein’s　unwillingness　to
cooperate　with　UN　weapons　inspections．　Koizumi　also　quickly　announced
his　support　for　the　US－led　coalition且ghting　in　Iraq　when　the　War　actually
started，　saying　that　he　expected　people　in　Japan　would　understand　the
decision　ofthe　Bush　Administration．
　　In　the　Asahi，　there　is　a　clear　pattem　in　its　anti－US　tone　of　stories．　First，
Asahi’s　fbreign　correspondents　in　the　US，　mostly　stationed　in　Washington，
D．C，　and　New　York，　report　the　latest　actions　of　the　Bush　Administration’s
policies　over　Iraq．　It　seems　that　those　correspondents　implicitly　or　explicitly
select　the　news　appropriate　fbr　their　Japanese　audience．　Thus，　relatively
simple　contents，　such　as　officials’　press　conferences，　are　often　selected　from
the　information　they　obtain　in　the　US．
　　Second，　along　with　these　fbreign　correspondents’reporting，　commentaries
written　by　commentators　and，　editors　in　Asahi　are　attached．　Scholars’
commentaries　are　sometimes　added　as　well．　They　often　criticize　US
expansionism　through　these　commentaries．　These　commentaries　openly
criticize　US　expansionism　and　imperialism　afしer　the　g　l　l　attack。　They　are
very　critical　against　the　US　position　over　Iraq，　especially　the　Bush　doctrine，
which　is　a　combination　of　new　sets　of　fbreign　policies，　such　as　the　pre一
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emptive　war　and　the　right　of　the　US　to　pursue　unilateral　military　action，　if
necessary．　These　commentaries　often　deliver　relatively　simple　plots．　For
example，　one　commentary　suggests　that　after　the　91　1　attacks，　the　US　tUrned
into　a　warmongering　nation　which　rushes　into　a　war，　not　for　the　elimination
of　the　terrorist　networks，　but　fbr　the　purpose　of　benefiting　their　own　country，
such　as　securing　oil　interests　in　the　Middle　East．
Regarding　uses　of　commentaries，　there　seems　to　be　something　in　common
among　commentators　whom　the　paper　chooses．　They　appear　to　share　similar
point　ofview　about　the　lraqi　issues　to　that　which　the　Asahi　often　presents　in
its　previous　stories　and　editorials．　In　an　interview　article　of　Sadako　Ogata，
fbrmer　United　Nations　High　Commissioner　fbr　RefUgees　and　one　of　the
most　famous　scholars　of　international　relations　in　Japan，　many　of　her
remarks　sound　familiar　to　readers　of　the　Asahi．　She　basically　points　out　that
the　way　the　US　has　prepared　fbr　the　War　in　Iraq　is　problematic　because
although　Hussein　has　been　dictatorial，　the　link　between　the　War　on　Terror
and　the　overthrow　of　the　Hussein　regime　is　not　firmly　established
（December　l　l，2002）．
　　Third，　the　Asahi　features　the　US　actions’possible　impact　on　Japanese
politics．　This　includes　reactions　from　Japanese　legislatUres，　of猛cials，　and　the
public　and　dispute　over　the　possible　dispatch　of　the　Japanese　Self－Defense
Forces　to　Iraq．　Since　the　Asahi　has　been　very　negative　toward　both　the　Bush
doctrine　and　the　overseas　dispatch　of　the　SDF，　these　articles　usually
accentUate　unfavorable　opinions　about　helping　the　Bush　Administration．
2）Imminence　of　the　War　with　Saddam
　　It　is　essential　that　the　two　media　differently　recognize　the　feasibility　and
the　imminence　of　the　war　with　Saddam　Hussein．　While　the　New　York　Times
reported　in　this　period　that　the　war　is　imminent，　the　Asahi’s　maj　or　storyline
is　that　the　war　is　only　a　possibility．　Especially，　after　the　US　Congressional
resolution　to　use　fbrce　to　the　Iraqi　regime，　the　NYT’s　storyline　indicated　that
the　question　is　not　whether　to　start　the　war，　but　when　to　start　the　war．　In
contrast，　the　Asahi　often　suggested　that　the　most　important　agenda　is　to　find
the　WMD，　not　to　refer　fUrther　discussions　over　sanctions　toward　lraq．
　　One　conscious　media　frame　that　the　New　York　Times　employs　is　that
”war　is　imminent　and　inevitable．”An　article（”The　Hazardous　Path　Ahead，lt
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October　l　1，2002）suggests　that　infbrmation　gathered　by　the　Central
Intelligence　Agency　made　clear　that”how　difficult　it　will　be　to　manage　an
escalating　crisis　in　Iraq　in　ways　that　assure　a　constructive　outcome．”Also，
even　befbre　the　Congressional　resolution　to　attack　Iraq　was　passed，　this
article　even　reports　about　the　Bush　Administration’s　post－war　govemance　of
Iraq．　According　to　the　story，　Washington　must　be　mind血111to　establish　a
postwar　Iraqi　govemment　that　does　away　with　Saddam　Hussein冒s　weapons
programs　and　reflects　the　desires　of　Iraq，s　diverse　population．”The　story
also　suggests　that　the　administration　has　already　warned　Iraqi　military
officers　that　they　risk　prosecution　fbr　war　crimes．
　　Another　a而cle　of　the　NYT（”Testing　lraq　on　Arms　lnspectors，”October
l，2002）suggests　that　the　problem　is　that　Iraq　has”never　fUlly　complied
with　the［UN］resolutions，　which　contain　no　meaningful　deadlines　or
enfbrcement　provisions　beyond　the　continuation　of　increasingly　porous
economic　sanctions．”Several　articles　of　the　New　York　Times蟹op－ed　page
are　more　clearly丘amed　stating　that　the”war　is　imminent　and　inevitable．”A
typical　article　is　written　by　a　conservative　columnist，　William　Safire．　He
calls　for　ousting　Saddam　Hussein　in　an　article（”Saddam，s　Last　Ploy，”
October　7，2002）．　According　to　Safire，　without　the　regime　change，　the
destruction　of　all　potential　weapons　of　mass　destruction　is　impossible．
Although　not　explicit，　many　articles　of　the　NYT’，　including　the　Safire
colu㎜，　imply　that”the　evil”is　the　Iraq　regime　and　that”the　good”is　the
United　States．　This”good　vs．　evil”dichotomy　is　that　frame　that　the　Bush
Administration　employed　and　it　was　the　most　basic　storyline　of　the　NYT
during　the　run－up　to　the　war　period．
　　In　contrast，　the　Asahi　basically　maintains　its　assertion　that　there　must　be　a
way　not　to　initiate　a　military　conf【ict，　even　though　the　US　believes　that　the
war　is　inevitable．　The　Asahi　seems　to　insist　that　renunciation　of　war　is　the
fundamental　strategy　fbr　the　world　peace　as　if　there　were　no　other　better
alternatives　fbr　maintaining　international　security．　Because　of　this　fact，
many，　if　not　most，　articles　of　the　Asahi　appear　to　be　holding　a　very　strong
ant1－war　SentlmentS．
　　In　the　last　minutes　befbre　the　war　started，　the　anti－war　rhetoric　of　the
Asahi　becomes　very　emphatic．　The　editorial　dated　one　day　befbre　the　War
began（”There　is　No　Justification　for　the　War，”March　20，2003）suggests
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that　there　is　global　opposition　to　the　war，　and　the　intemational　community　is
very　suspicious　about　America’s　motives．　Also，　the　article　argues　that　the
Bush　Administration　is”mshing　into　war　unilaterallジat　the　cost　of　the
authority　of　the　United　Nations．　Thus，　the　paper　repeatedly　suggests　that
there　is　no　reasonable　justification　for　the　War　in　lraq．
　　Regarding　the　urgency　of　the　war，　another　pivotal　difference　betWeen　the
two　papers　is　how　much　the　anti－war　protests　are　covered　in　their　papers．
The　Asahi，　frequently　refers　to　more　anti－war　activities　around　the　world
than　the　NYT　does．　In　an　article　regarding　the”human　shield”in　Iraq，　the
Asahi　reports　Japanese　civilian　volunteers，　anti－war　tactics　to　deter　the
coalition　fbrces　from　attacking　Iraq（March　13，2003）．　Although　the　paper
quotes　a　Japanese　official’s　warning　not　to　enter　Iraq　fbr　safety　reasons，
many　articles　are　more　sympathetic　to　the　anti　US　activists’　position．
3）Roles　of　the　United　Nations
　　Another　crucial　difference　in　reporting　betWeen　the　tWo　media　during　this
period　is　about　the　role　and　the　strength　of　the　United　Nations．　The　gap
regarding　the　UN　stories　between　the　two　media　is　supported　by　quantitative
analysis．　In　terms　of丘equency，　the　Unite　Nations　was　mentioned　in　36％of
the　articles　from　the　Asahi，　but　in　only　15％of　the　articles丘om　the　NYT
during　the　run－up　Period．
　　Frequent　storylines　that　the　New　York　Times　adopts　is　that”UN
inspection　is　not　effective　enough　to　rectify　the　deeds　of　Saddam．”The　NYT
is　generally　very　skeptical　of　the　inspections．　Thus，　the　limit　of　UN
inspection　in　Iraq　is　reiterated　in　the　NYT　stories　and　eventuaUy　leads　to
emphatically　pointing　out　the　impossibility　of　any　peacefU1　solutions．　While
the　paper　often　refer　to　the　importance　of　diplomatic　solutions　to　prevent　the
conflict，　the　calls　fbr　such　as　deliberant　policy　are　frequently　juxtaposed　to
the　fact　that　Saddam　Hussein　has　procrastinated　to　reform　his
Administration　for　a　long　time　after　the　First　Gulf　War．　In　addition，　it　is
interesting　that　in　the　NYT　articles　most　of　the　quotations　from　the　Iraq
oflicials　are　framed　as”phony．”Especially，　Moha㎜ed　Saeed　a1－Shahaf，
the　Minister　of　Infbrmation　of　Iraq　government，　is　often　the　s呵ect　of
derision　by　the　paper．
　　What　is　characterized　as　even　more　different　is　the　degree　to　which　the
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UN　is　e脆ctive．　The　Asahi’s　stories　have　a　tendency　to　refer　to　the　UN　as　if
the　organization　can　decide”the　fate　of　the　world．”According　to　the　Asahi，
the　UN　is　a　very　powerful　organization，　which　seems　to　be　an　ultimate，
omnipotent　police　regarding　world　order，　By　contrast，　the　NYT　has　more
fbcus　on　the　domestic　actions　regarding　Iraq．　In　the　NYT’s　articles　the　UN
also　has　a　strong　impact　on　international　security　and　can　decide　on　the
direction　of　the　inspections　and　sanctions．　The　UN，　nonetheless，　apPears　in
the　articles　to　be　only　a　place　to　negotiate，　and　its　decisionmaking　regarding
sanctions　is　perennially　dragging．
　　In　an　article，　the　NYT　admits　that　the　United　States　cannot　defeat　Al
Qaeda　without　the　help　of　dozens　of　other　nations，　and　stresses　the
deliberation　not　to　give　way　to　the　use　of　fbrce　until　peacefUl　paths　to　Iraqi
disarmament　become　impossible（”The　Rush　to　War”March　3，2003）．
However，　the　articlels　position　about　the　use　of　powers　is　based　on　a　very
realistic　world　view．　The　article　says，”［w］e　are　not　under　any　illusion　that
Mr．　Hussein　is　disabling　his　missiles　simply　because　he　likes　the　idea．．．The
UN．　must　realize　that　whatever　success　it　has　achieved　of　late　in　getting　Iraq
to　abide　by　its　directives　has　come　only　because　of　American　military
might．”Here　we　find　that　the　NYT’s　basic　perspective　regarding　the　use　of
military　fbrces　is　quite　different　from　that　of　the　Asahi．　While　the　NYT　is
relatively　realistic　in　dealing　with　Iraq，　the　Asahi　seems　to　believe　that
denouncing　military　attack　is　a　starting　point　toward　resolving　the　tension
amOng　nat10nS．
　　Moreover，　the　basic　frames　of　the　issue　are　quite　opposite　between　the
two　media．　One　of　the　Asahi’s　major　storylines　is　that　”the　evi1”may　be　the
US，　and”the　good”is　the　international　community，　most　notably　the　United
Nations．　This　is　in　sharp　contrast　to　the　NYT　because　one　of　the　American
newspaper’s　basic　storylines　connotes　that”the　evil”is　the　Iraq　regime　and
”the　good”is，　as　mentioned，　the　United　States
4）Civilians　Casualties
　　In　the　run－up　period，　it　is　interesting　to　compare　the　two　media　regarding
how　they　refer　to　civilian　casualties　and　damages．　While　39　articles　in　the
NYT　contain　some　reference　to　civilian　casualties　and　damages，　the　Asahi
shares　twice　as　many　articles（44）as　the　NYT（21）regarding　the　impact　on
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civilians．　Also，　Asahi’s　emphasis　on　civilian　suffering　is　demonstrated　not
only　by　the　number　of　articles　but　also　by　their　contents．
　　The　war°s　impact　on　the　people　in　Iraq　seems　of　little　interest　to
joumalists　in　the　NYT．　Only　fbur　of　the　articles　fbcus　on”Iraqi　casualties”
as　their　main　topic　during　this　period．　Nine　articles　feature”coalition
casualties”as　their　main　topic．　A　lack　of　attention　on　the　victims　of　war　is
one　aspect　of　neglecting　their　culture　and　society，　as　well　as　dehumanizing
an　enemy．　Since　the　war　had　not　started　yet　in　this　period，　many　of　these
references　to　casualties　are　assessments　of　a　possible　number　once　the　war
would　begin．
　　Instead　of　featuring　Iraqi　casualties，　the　NYT　features　the　Bush
Administration，s　preparation　to　conduct　an”ethical　war”．　Many　of　the　NYT
articles　explain　Bush　Administration’s　attempts　to　reduce”collateral
damage，”the　terminology　the　Pentagon　uses　to　refer　to　civilian　casualties
and　damages　which　are”unavoidable　accidents”（or”by　military”）in　the
war．　Several　articles　report　new　weapons　to　reduce”collateral　damage”（e．9．，
”Talking　Aim　at　an　Enemy’s　Chips”　February　20，2003）．　Another　interesting
article（”Battle　Plan：Spare　Iraq’s　Civilians”Febmary　23，2003）explains　in
great　lengths　that”damage　control”has　become　a　standard　part　of　mission
planning，　unlike　the　war　in　Vietnam　According　to　the　article，　the　Bush
administration　has　designed　an　air　campaign　that　tries　to　avoid　destroying
bridges，　roads　and　other　public　works　so　that　country　can　be　rebuilt　quickly，
and　peoples’daily　lives　are　not　completely　disrupted．　Also，　the
Administration　has　instnlcted　its　planners　to　select　targets　where　homes，
schools　and　mosques　are　least　likely　to　be　damaged　and　even　required　them
to　calculate　whether　bombs　that　drift　off　target　might　hit　civilian　targets．
　　In　another　article　of　the　NYT（”Ethical　War？Do　the　Good　Guys　Finish
First？”March　8，2003），　the　paper　also　suggests　that　there　is　a　limitation　fbr
such　an”ethical　war”．　The　article　points　out　that　the　problem　is　that
”collateral　damage”control　becomes　so　important　fbr　every　aspect　in
military　operations　that　military　personnel　sometimes　cannot　effectively
attack　the　enemy．　According　to　the　article，　since　American　military　policy
requires　legal　advisers　to　approve　combat　targets　in　advance，”clearance
delays　and　denials　allowed　important　Taliban　and　Qaeda　members　to　escape
unscathed”during　the　War　in　Afghanistan．　Also，　the　article　emphasizes　the
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dif行culty　of　distinguishing　between　civilians　and　military　personnel　in　an
actual　battlezone．
　　While　the　NYT’s　articles　present　the　vague　possibility　of　civilian
damages，　the　Asahi　describes　more　seriously，　sometimes　emotionally　the
impact　with　which　the　war　affects　civilians　in　lraq．　An　Asahi　article　C’There
is　No　Reasonable　Justification　fbr　Iraq　War”March　20，2003）suggests
”Even　if　the　war　ends　quickly，　as　America　hopes，　it　will　still　have　to　bring
Iraq　and　its　capital　to　submission　with　quite　a　different　outcome　from　the
1991Persian　Gulf　War．　Many　innocent　civilians　will　be　killed　or　harmed　in
the　process．　This　conflict　may　well　throw　the　world　into　unexpected　chaos．”
5）The　News　Sources
　　Also，　in　the　mn－up　period　of　the　War，　the　content　of　the　two　media　are
quite　di脆rent　in　light　of　their　news　sources．　While　the　NYT　o食en　quotes
丘om　o伍cials　of　the　Bush　Administration　as　well　as　members　of　Congress
and　scholars，　the　Asahi　largely　depends　on　a　US　govemment曾s　spokesperson，
such　as　the　press　secretary．　Also，　it　is　notable　that　the　Asahi　featUres　one
govemment　official　more　frequently　than　others．　The　of且cial　is　Richard
Armitage，　the　Deputy　Secretary　of　State，　who　is　famous　as　a　Japanese
specialist．　Although　the　NYT　quotes　Armitage　as　well，　the　presence　of
Annitage　in　the　Asahi　is　ve1y　conspicuous．　Each　time　Armitage　appears　in
public　lectures，　the　Asahi　seems　never　fail　to　featUre　him．　The　Asahi　seems
to　believe　that　Armitage　remarks　are　trustwo曲y　source　to　understand　the
Bush　govemment’s　official　views　on　Iraq　and　to　assess　fUture　US　policies
over　Iraq．
　　Also，　the　newspapars層choice　of　commentators　differs　sharply．　As
mentioned　above，　the　Asahi　mostly　features　scholars．　The　NYT
commentators　are，　however，　more　varied丘om　scholars　and　fbrmer　military
personnel　to　technology　analysts　ofweaponry．
IV．　Findings　and　Analyses
　　There　are　four　maj　or　findings　for　this　research．
Findings　l：The　US　and　Japanese　news　media　framed　quite　differently　the
War　in　Iraq．
Comparative　Content　Analysis　betWeen　the　US　and　Japanese　Media　during　the　Run－up　PeriOd　of　the　lraq　War　67
Findings　2：The　US　and　Japanese　news　media　show　quite　different　patterns
of　sympathy　and　antipathy　toward　the　US－led　forces　in　the　lraq　War．
Findings　3：The　Japanese　media’s　approach　to　the　Iraq　War　is　a　less
military－strategy　centered　and　more　diplomacy　oriented　than　the　US　media．
Findings　4：The　Japanese　news　media　put　more　importance　on　the　civilian
casualties　in　Iraq　than　the　US　media．
　　Regarding　Findings　1，　it　is　concluded　that　the　US　and　Japanese　news
media　quite　differently　framed　the　War　in　lraq．　Since　mass　media　reporting
is　closely　associated　to　its　countries°politics，　society，　and　public　opinion，
there　are　significant　differences　in　how　the　media　tended　to　frame　the　issues
related　to　the　justification　fbr　war，　the　progress　of　the　war，　and　the　outcome
of　the　war．　Also，　Japan　is　not　the　part　of　the　coalition　fbrces　and　distanced
itself　from　this　conflict，　although　the　Koizumi　Govemment　has　supported
the　US　government　positions，　Thus，　the　US　and　Japanese　news　media　show
quite　different　patterns　of　sympathy　and　antipathy　toward　the　US－led　fbrces
in　the　Iraq　War（Findings　2）and　that　the　Japanese　media’s　approach　to　the
Iraq　War　is　more　fbcused　on　diplomatic　relations，　especially　in　the　United
Nations，　and　less　military－strategy　centered　than　the　US　media（Findings　3）．
Finally，　the　reporting　of　civilian　casualties　in　Iraq　show　significant
differences　in　the　US　and∫apanese　media　because　there　is　a　more
sympathetic　view　of　Iraq　and　the　Arabs　in　the∫apanese　media（Findings　4）．
V．Condusion
　　This　comparative　stUdy　of　prewar　reporting　suggests　that　in　tim6　of　crisis，
the　New　York　Times　and　the　Asahi　provided　di　fferent”realities”even
though　they　are　reporting　the　same　events．　The　main　finding　is　that　the
contents　of　the　two　media　are　quite　different　both　qualitatively　and
quantitatively，　especially　on　UN　weapons　inspections．
　　Also，　it　is　interesting　that　the　two　leading　liberal　media　show　completely
different　reaction　toward　their　respective　govemments．　Compared　with　the
Asahi，　the　NYT　is　less　critical　toward　the　US　policies　of　Iraq．　Critics　often
suggest　that　the　absence　of　critical　reporting　in　the　American　media　allowed
the　Bush　Administration　to　dominate　the　fbreign　policy　agenda（e．g．
Schechter，2003）．　During　the　nln－up　period，　the　US　continued　to　fight　the
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”war　against　terror．　Although　the　alleged　links　between　Al　Qaeda　and
Saddam　Hussein’s　regime　were　not　proven，　there　was　a　consensus　in　the
United　States　that　the　link　is　plausible．　Many　critics　suggested　that　media
reporting　in　the　US　implicitly　catered　to　this　predominant　consensus　that
apPeared　to　take　the　links　fbr　granted．
　　Although　the　Japanese　government　officially　supported　US　policies　of
Iraq，　the　Asahi　is　very　negative　toward　both　the　Koizumi　and　Bush
Administrations．　The　Asahi　basically　maintains　its　assertion　that　there　must
be　a　way　not　to　initiate　a　military　conflict．　The　frame　of　the　Asahi　may
reflect　the　liberal　ideology　of　the　paper．　In　general，　the　Asahi　keeps　its
distance　from　the　American　media　such　as　the　NYT．　Arguably，　the
consistent　use　of　liberal　commentators　and　perspectives　from　other　counties
and　intemational　organizations　helps　the　Asahi　maintain　probably　more
diversified　views．
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（日本語要約）
イラク戦争開戦直前期における
日米両国のメディアの内容分析
前　嶋　和　弘
　本研究は、日米の比較政治コミュニケーションのケーススタディーであり、
イラク戦争の開戦直前期（2002年10月1日から2003年3月19日）の約6
カ月間について、日米双方の代表的なメディアである『朝日新聞』と『ニュ
ーヨーク・タイムズ』のイラク情勢や開戦の可能性に関する記事の内容分析
を行うものである。具体的には、両紙掲載の記事のうち、イラク戦争を扱っ
た、あるいは関連した記事の全て（『朝日新聞』990記事、『ニューヨーク・
タイムズ』1242記事）について、量的な内容分析を行った上で、イラク情
勢をめぐる両国のニュース報道の内容が、特定の筋書きを持っていることに
着眼し、質的な内容分析を行い、その相違点を包括的に分析した。
　内容分析の結果、次の5点において、両紙の違いが明確となった。　5点
とは、（1）アメリカのイラク政策、（2）戦争に対する切迫感（3）イラ
ク情勢における国連の役割、（4）一般市民の犠牲とその可能性、（5）ニ
ュース・ソースーである。この中でも両紙の間で、大きく差が出たのが、
「アメリカのイラク政策」についてであり、『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』の場
合、r朝日新聞』に比べて、「アメリカのイラク政策」の記述が量的にも多か
ったほか、質的に分析しても、政府の対応や、今後の戦略や戦争への準備な
ど、内容も非常に具体的であり、国連核査察に対するフセイン政権の対応の
遅れのため、「戦争やむなし」という論調や記述が目立っていた。これに対
し、r朝日新聞』の場合は戦争を急ぐブッシュ政権に批判的な論調や記述が
主流だった。また、戦争に対する切迫感は、『朝日新聞』が「戦争は選択肢
の一つでしかない」といった内容の論調や記述が目立つ一方で、『ニューヨ
ーク・タイムズ』の場合、戦争は「“あるかないか”ではなく、“いつか”」
といった切迫した視点からの報道が主であった。
　さらに、イラク情勢における国連の役割については、『朝日新聞』の方が
国連に言及した記事が占める割合が多かったほか、国連の役割自身について
も肯定的であり、「世界の運命を決める」国連の有効性が強調されていた。
これに対して、『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』の場合、国連の役割に懐疑的で
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あり、イラク査察は効果的でなく、フセイン政権の大量破壊兵器開発をとめ
るのに十分でないことを指摘した記事が目立っていた。また、一般市民の犠
牲とその可能性についても、両紙の扱いは異なっており、『朝日新聞』より、
『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』の方が記述そのものの割合が少なかった。ニュ
ース・ソースについても、大きく異なっており、『朝日新聞』は、公式の記
者会見をソースにした報道が中心だったが、『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』の
場合、政権担当者、議会関係者などからの直接取材が多かった。
　このように、両紙の「メディア・フレーム」は大きく異なっており、同じイ
ラク情勢を取り扱っていても、記事上では大きく異なった内容が報じられて
いた。
